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The Sixth Amendment Right to
Effective Counsel: What Does It
Mean Today?
I. INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees that "[i] n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to . . .the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' Al-
though the amendment was adopted in 1791, it is still unclear today
what privileges it bestows on an accused, what responsibilities it
places on the state and federal governments, and what safeguards
it provides our adversary system of justice. The sixth amendment,
like other constitutional provisions, is still in a state of evolution.
Development of the constitutional right to assistance of counsel
has focused on two major areas: (1) The right to counsel 2 and (2)
the right to effective counsel.3 Although each principle is a distinct
concept, the right to counsel cases often emphasize the importance
of the right to effective counsel. The rationale used by the Court to
extend the right to counsel in a given situation demonstrates that
it demands more than the mere appointment of an attorney to ful-
fill this right. The Court expects the attorney to assume an active
role as an advocate and counsel. For example, in the landmark de-
cision of Gideon v. Wainwright,4 the Court held that the sixth
amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel extended to the
states through its incorporation into the due process clause of the
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (no person can be sub-
jected to imprisonment unless counsel is made available); Coleman v. Ala-
bama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (an indigent criminal defendant has a right to an
attorney at a preliminary hearing held to determine whether there is suffi-
cient evidence to submit the case to the grand jury); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to appointed coun-
sel on appeal, when appeal is granted as a matter of right).
3. See § H of text infra.
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court held that the right of an indigent criminal de-
fendant to appointed counsel is a right fundamental and essential to a fair
trial. Id. at 345.
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fourteenth amendment. 5 In so holding, the Court stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with a crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for him-
self whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules
of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issues or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence.
6
The right to counsel is more fully developed than is the right to
effective counsel. The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions
directly addressed the issue of whether the right to counsel should
be extended in given instances, and, as a result, it has enumerated
specific situations in which an accused must be provided with
counsel. In addition, the Court has established a general criterion
for determining the other situations in which an attorney must be
provided.7 However, in reference to the right to effective counsel,
the Supreme Court has done little more than recognize that there
is such a right. It has been left up to the various federal circuit
courts and the states to develop their own criteria for determining
when in a given situation there has been effective representation
by counsel. As a result, there is confusion and a notable lack of
uniformity in the area.
The Supreme Court has specifically held that reversal is auto-
matic when one has been deprived of one's right to counsel.
Prejudice due to that deprivation need not be established. The
Court has held that the right to counsel is among the "constitu-
tional rights so basic to a fair trial that its infraction can never be
treated as harmless error.' 8 However, the Supreme Court has not
addressed this issue with regard to the right to effective counsel.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (emphasis
added)).
7. The Supreme Court has held that an indigent criminal defendant must be
provided with counsel at any "critical stage" of a criminal proceeding. See,
e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) (Court held that once an accused is indicted, the accused is enti-
tled to have counsel present at a line-up where witnesses seek to identify the
perpetrator of the crime). A critical stage has been defined as one which re-
quires an attorney's presence in order to preserve the defendant's right to a
fair trial; that is, whether at any period of the proceedings there is a substan-
tial possible prejudice to the defendant's rights and whether the presence of
counsel would help to avoid that prejudice.
8. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
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Many of the federal circuit courts and state courts have held that
the same error rule-that prejudice need not be shown-should
also apply to both situations since the right to counsel would be
meaningless without the right to effective counsel. However,
others have held that the two rights address different problems;
the right to effective counsel is not so essential to a fair trial as to
require automatic reversal in its absence.9 They instead have em-
ployed the harmless error rule, which requires the demonstration
of prejudice. In those jurisdictions which have used the harmless
error rule, the extent of the right to effective counsel is obscured
by an additional controversy over which party has the burden of
showing prejudice. Some courts have held that it is the defend-
ant's burden, others have held that it is the government's, and still
others have taken an intermediary position.' 0
Another controversy which exists with regard to the right to ef-
fective counsel but not as to the right to counsel is whether one
who has retained counsel has the same right to effective assistance
as one whose attorney was appointed. Once it has been deter-
mined that a defendant has the right to an attorney, counsel may
be retained or appointed; either type of representation will satisfy
the right. However, with respect to effective counsel, some courts
have held that the right applies only to defendants with appointed
counsel; others have applied the right to those with either retained
or appointed counsel."
This comment will examine these controversial aspects of the
right to effective counsel. Special emphasis will be placed on the
law of Nebraska and of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
II. THE PROBLEM
In 1973 Chief Justice Warren Burger made the allegation that
significant numbers of American lawyers are incompetent in the
area of trial advocacy. He stated:
Whatever the legal issues or claims, the indispensable element in the trial
of a case is a minimally adequate advocate for each litigant. Many judges
in general jurisdiction trial courts have stated to me that fewer than 25
percent of the lawyers appearing before them are genuinely qualified;
other judges go as high as 75 percent. I draw this from conversations ex-
tending over the past twelve to fifteen years at judicial meetings and semi-
nars, with literally hundreds of judges and experienced lawyers. It would
be safer to pick a middle ground and accept as a working hypothesis that
from one-third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in the serious cases
are not really qualified to render fully adequate representation.1 2
9. See § VI of text infra.
10. See § VII of text infra.
11. See § V of text infra.
12. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifi-
1042 [Vol. 59:1040
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Chief Justice Burger delineated six aspects of inadequate advo-
cacy which he observed as a trial judge in the federal court system:
(1) the inability to develop concrete images for the triers of fact
through the questioning of witnesses in conformity with the rules
of evidence; (2) the inability to know when and when not to cross-
examine, and the inability to cross examine effectively; (3) the lack
of knowledge of when leading questions may be asked; (4) the lack
of knowledge on the part of many lawyers that "inflammatory" evi-
dence should not be placed in the sight of jurors until after it has
been offered into evidence; (5) the tendency of many lawyers to
dwell unduly on issues which are not in controversy; and (6) the
failure of attorneys to observe rules of professional manners and
etiquette. 13 Others in the legal profession have agreed with the
Chief Justice that there is a problem of incompetence. They have
disagreed, however, with his statistics. For example, a 1978 survey
dealing with the quality of advocacy in the federal courts revealed
inadequacy on the part of one-twelfth of the lawyers appearing
before the federal courts.14
The members of the legal profession are not alone in the obser-
vation of this problem. Since the 1960's, the number of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims brought by criminal defendants has
been increasing. A survey done by Professor Strazzella revealed
that during the years 1963-1965 (pre-Gideon) there were 78 claims
of ineffectiveness reported by the federal courts of appeals,
whereas between the years 1969-1971 (post-Gideon) there were 282
claims reported-nearly a 300% increase.15 These claims were
brought on direct appeals, on motions for new trials, on habeas
corpus writs, and in other collateral proceedings.' 6 The claims
cation of Advocates Essential to our System of Justice?, 42 FoRDHmAM L REV.
227, 234 (1973). Judge Bazelon of the Federal Court of Appeals in the District
of Columbia similarly stated: "I have often been told that if my Court were to
reverse every case in which there was inadequate counsel, we would have to
send back half the convictions in my jurisdiction." Bazelon, The Defective
Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CiN. L REV. 1, 22-23 (1973).
13. Burger, supra note 12, at 234-35.
14. Oakes, Lawyer and Judge: The Ethical Duty of Competency, in ETics AND
ADVOcACY: A NJAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY
IN THE UNrrED STATES 57, 58 n.1O (Final Rep. 1978).
15. Strazella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems,
19 ARiz. L. REV. 443, 445 n.8 (1977). Strazzella attributes the increase to the
expansion of the sixth amendment by the Supreme Court, and to the expan-
sion of devices for collateral attacks, as a result of three Supreme Court cases
that expanded the use of habeas corpus: Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Tow-
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
Strazella, supra, at 443-44.
16. Annot., 26 A.LR. FED. 218, 230 (1976). Today the sole remedy for a sixth
amendment violation due to ineffective counsel is an overturning of the con-
viction with a retrial usually following. Id. The scope of review on direct ap-
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have been based on a varied set of fact patterns, including attor-
neys sleeping during the trial,'7 being drunk during the trial,18 fail-
ing to make objections at trial, failing to make motions on time,
failing to institute proper pre-trial investigations, and failing to be
free of all conflicting interest.19
Despite the general recognition of the problem of incompe-
tence, the courts have done little to eliminate it. They have failed
even to take the initial step of establishing clearly what constitutes
incompetence. As Justice Brennan noted in Wainwright v.
Sykes,20 "most courts [the Supreme Court included] traditionally
have resisted any realistic inquiry into the competency of trial
counsel."2 1 What needs to be established is a criterion for the de-
termination of what constitutes effective representation. The test
needs to be flexible enough to handle a wide range of factual situa-
tions. Yet it also needs to be stringent enough to allow for mean-
ingful evaluation of a claim, and to give the courts and attorneys
sufficient guidance to enable them to act.
One commentator has noted the additional problem of finding a
standard that will also take into consideration various institutional
factors.22 Among these are: (1) the judicial tendency to uphold
convictions because of the supposed importance of the finality of
judgments;2 3 (2) the difficulty of securing "seasoned practitioners"
for the numerous criminal cases which arise each year;24 (3) that
public defenders are hampered by the lack of adequate support
staff, the wide diversity of their caseload, and the size of that
peal is usually limited to the record of the trial, while in a collateral
proceeding, matters outside the record may be brought in as evidence. See
also Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Depar-
tures from Habeas Co7pus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973); Waltz, Inadequacy of
Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Crim-
inal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 289 (1964).
17. United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970).
18. Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941).
19. See Annot., supra note 16; Comment, Ineffective Representation as a Basisfor
Relieffrom Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 CoLrM. J. L Soc.
PROB. 1, 8-13 (1977). Professor Strazella's survey revealed of the 282 claims
filed between the years 1969-1971, two claims were filed concerning lack of
effectiveness at the arraignment proceeding, three cases concerned the pre-
liminary hearing, two cases dealt with sentencing, 11% of the cases involved
pre-trial preparation, 27% concerned guilty pleas, 4% dealt with pre-trial
practice, 47% involved trial performance and 6.7% concerned failures to per-
fect appeal. Strazella, supra note 15.
20. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
21. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
22. Comment, supra note 19, at 22-24.
23. Id. at 23.
24. Id. at 22.
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load;25 and (4) that most dockets are so overcrowded that many
trial judges are motivated "to push parties to a disposition, deny-
ing continuances to unprepared attorneys whose clients may later
successfully claim ineffective representation owing to lack of suffi-
cient time for preparation. '26
I. SUPREME COURT CASES
Since 1932 the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that the Constitution not only provides for the right to assistance
of counsel in criminal cases, but also the right to effective assist-
ance of counsel. In Powell v. Alabama27 the Supreme Court stated
that
in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance,
feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court whether
requested or not to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due
process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a
time under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in
the preparation and trial of the case.28
Powell held that the right to effective counsel was denied when the
trial court appointed the local bar en masse to represent indigent
codefendants. The Court asserted that a specific individual or indi-
viduals should have been assigned, and emphasized that ap-
pointed counsel should be imbued with a "clear appreciation of
responsibility or impressed with the individual sense of duty."29
Since Powell the Court has declared unconstitutional various
state established procedures which acted to limit an attorney's ef-
fectiveness. For example, in 1975 the Court held unconstitutional a
state statute which gave a judge in a non-jury criminal trial the
power to deny defense counsel the opportunity to deliver a closing
argument.30 Similarly, the Court has indicated that procedures
that are constitutional on their face cannot be used in such a man-
ner as to prevent effective representation. For example, the Court
held that a request for a continuance cannot be denied if it would
preclude any consultation between counsel and the defendant.
The Court found that such denials would be subject to review even
though the disposition of requests for continuance is generally
25. Id.
26. Id. at 23.
27. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
28. Id. at 71. Another problem in Powell was that it was never made clear by the
appointing court whether the bar would appear on behalf of the defendants
after the arraignment.
29. Id. at 56.
30. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975).
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within the discretion of the trial judge.31
Many commentators have asserted that the Supreme Court has
been avoiding the issue of assessing the competency of actual per-
formances of attorneys.32 Since Powell, the Court has not set
aside a single verdict due to incompetent attorney performance. 33
In one case presented to the Court, the attorney did not consult
with his client until they were on the way to the trial.34 Although
the attorney was totally unfamiliar with the facts of the case and
had no trial strategy planned, the Court chose not to rule on the
issue of whether that performance constituted ineffective counsel.
Instead, it held that the defendant's right had not been violated
because he failed to prove that he had been prejudiced by the law-
yer's performance. 35
It was not until 1970, in McMann v. Richardson,36 that the Court
formulated any sort of criteria for determining when counsel has
or has not been effective. 37 The Court held that the determination
of whether an attorney was incompetent in advising a defendant to
plead guilty depended on whether that advice was within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. It
did not depend on whether a court would in hindsight consider the
advice to be right or wrong.38 However, the Court refused to delin-
eate what was within that zone of competence, stating:
Beyond this we think the matter, for the most part, should be left to the
good sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that if
the right to counsel guaranteed by the constitution is to serve its purpose,
the defendant cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and
that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by
attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their
courts.
3 9
Most of the federal trial courts have attempted to abide by the
Supreme Court's position. Several of the federal circuit courts
have extended the scope of McMann to apply to situations other
than that of the guilty plea. A few courts have gone beyond that,
31. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445-46 (1940). The Court stated that counsel
must be given an opportunity to consult with the defendant and to prepare a
defense; otherwise, it "could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham
and nothing more than a formal compliance with the [constitutional] require-
ment that an accused be given assistance of counsel." Id. at 446. The Court
emphasized that the sixth amendment right to counsel could not be satisfied
by mere formal appointment. Id.
32. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 12, at 21.
33. Oakes, supra note 14, at 62.
34. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970).
35. Id. at 54.
36. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
37. Id. at 771.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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however, and have established specific guidelines; nevertheless,
others have refused to adopt any meaningful standard at all.
IV. STANDARDS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
In the 1955 Supreme Court case of Michel v. Louisiana,4° the
petitioner alleged that he had been denied effective assistance of
counsel because his attorney failed to ifie a timely motion to quash
his indictment even though the attorney had a reasonable time
within which to do so. 41 In addition, the petitioner pointed out that
his attorney was seventy-six or seventy-seven years old at the time
of the trial, and that he had been ill for several months during that
year.42 The Court rejected the petitioner's arguments, holding that
there is a presumption of effectiveness, and that the evidence of
this case did not overcome that presumption.43 The Court ob-
served that the decision whether or not to file the motion was a
question of trial strategy, and this "was entirely within the discre-
tion of [the attorneyl ."44 The Court also took notice of the fact that
the attorney was a well-known criminal lawyer who had been
honored by his local bar, and who had more than fifty years of trial
experience.
The Court's observations gave way to a set of general rules that
have been adopted by all of the circuits. They are: (1) all attor-
neys who are admitted as members of the bar are presumed to be
competent, and are presumed to have acted competently in any
given situation; (2) the fact that counsel was physically or men-
tally ill, aged, intoxicated, young or inexperienced, does not itself
overcome the presumption of effectiveness; (3) such facts, how-
ever, may be combined with other evidence to establish a claim of
ineffectiveness; (4) great deference is to be given to the attorneys
in the area of trial strategy and trial tactics; 45 (5) courts will not
judge an attorney's performance on the basis of hindsight; and (6)
40. 350 U.S. 91 (1955).
41. Id. at 100.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 101.
44. Id. at 101 n.7.
45. One commentator has vividly criticized this rule, stating that
[the] no-reversal-on-matters-of-tactical-judgement rule is an impre-
cise principle which clouds the consideration of ineffectiveness
claims. What is a 'tactical' matter and what is not is by no means
clear. The vagueness of the rule makes it a convenient tool for the
courts to avoid analysis and dismiss the claim for a number of un-
stated reasons .... The crucial inquiry is not whether appellate
judges can imagine an argument to justify counsel's behavior, but
whether the record indicates that the attorney was aware of the prob-
lem, considered the alternatives, and made a reasonable choice of
the best course of action.
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effective representation does not mean that the lawyer has to be
perfect or infallible, or that the defendant has to prevail.46
A. Farce And Mockery Standard
Beyond these rules, the standard today for determining
whether a given performance amounts to effective representation
varies among the courts. Until 1973, the standard employed by al
eleven federal circuit courts was the "farce and mockery" test, i.e.,
whether counsel's performance was so poor as to reduce the trial
to a farce or render it a mockery of justice. The performance had
to have been "so lacking in competence that it [became] the duty
of the court or the prosecution to observe and correct it."47 It must
have been "perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense or made
without adequate opportunity for conference or preparation."4
In 1970, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied this
standard in United States v. Katz,49 and held that the petitioner
was not denied effective assistance of counsel despite the fact that
his counsel was observed sleeping on two occasions when the
prosecution was examining a witness. The appellate court, in sup-
port of this holding, noted that the trial judge "[i] n denying the
motion for a new trial ... stated that the testimony during the pe-
riods of counsel's somnolence was not central to Katz' case and
that if it had been, she would have awakened him rather than have
waited for the luncheon recess to warn him."5 0
The "farce and mockery" standard is best illustrated, however,
by the case which originated it, Diggs v. Welch.51 The petitioner,
Diggs, alleged that he had been denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel when his attorney, either because of
ignorance or incompetence, misadvised him to plead guilty.52 The
federal district court phrased the issue as "whether a prisoner may
obtain a writ of habeas corpus on the sole ground that counsel
Comment, supra note 19, at 20.
Another problem in this area is the impact it will have on the question of
forfeiture. It has been held in Nebraska and elsewhere that "trial strategy
adopted by counsel without prior consultation with the accused will preclude
the accused from asserting constitutional claims [resulting from that strat-
egy] in the absence of exceptional circumstances." State v. Fowler, 201 Neb.
647, 657, 271 N.W.2d 341, 347 (1978). The issue is thoroughly discussed in
Strazella, supra note 15, at 474-84.
46. 5 Am. JuI. PROOF OF FACTS 2D, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel § 4 (1975).
47. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 899 (1945).
48. Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010
(1970).
49. 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970).
50. Id. at 931.
51. 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 899 (1945).
52. Id. at 668.
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properly appointed by the court to defend him, acted incompe-
tently and negligently during the proceedings."5 3 The court said
no: after recognizing that the petitioner had the right to "effective"
counsel, it stated that the word "effective" was not to be given a
liberal or broad interpretation.5 4
The "farce or mockery" standard was defined by the court to
mean "representation so lacking in competence that it becomes
the duty of the court or prosecution to observe it, and to correct it
. . . [a]llegations even of serious mistake on the part of an attor-
ney are [not] grounds for habeas corpus standing alone."55 The
court emphasized that any particular allegation of mistake would
be reviewed only as details making up a larger picture, the ration-
ale being that
"[f] ew trials are free from mistakes of counsel. How much these mistakes
contributed to the result can never be measured. There are no tests by
which it can be determined how many errors an attorney may make
before his batting average becomes so low as to make his representation
ineffective."
5 6
Generally, the reasons given for the development of such a high
standard for ineffective claims have been: (1) the fear that unprin-
cipled lawyers would act in collusion with their clients and would
perform below the minimum standards, so as to make their clients'
conviction vulnerable to collateral attacks;5 7 (2) the fear that the
courts would be overburdened with frivolous appeals;58 (3) the
fear that the claims would have the effect of putting defense coun-
sel on trial;59 and (4) the fear that a lower standard would prevent
attorneys from accepting appointments in criminal cases. 60
The standard has been sharply criticized by many coimenta-
tors and by modern courts.6 1 The critics have argued that experi-
ence over the years has proved much of the test's rationale to be
unsound. Furthermore, statistics on feigned ineffectiveness prove
that trepidation to be baseless.62 The temptation to feign ineffec-
tiveness appears to have been outweighed by the fear of losing
53. Id.
54. Id. at 669.
55. Id. at 670.
56. Id.
57. Comment, supra note 19, at 31.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 30.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (lst Cir. 1978); Bazelon, supra note 12; Comment, A
Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel, 14 WAKE FoREsT L REV. 175
(1978).
62. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1978).
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one's good reputation and of possible disciplinary action.63 Statis-
tics similarly belie the rationale that the strictness of the test will
eliminate frivolous appeals. As one commentator noted, most peti-
tions filed during the time the "farce and mockery" test was appli-
cable involved claims with little chance of success, thus indicating
that the "possibility of victory ... [is] not a major factor in the
defendant's decision to seek post conviction relief."64
An additional criticism is that the test's apparent focus on pro-
tecting the interests of the lawyers representing the criminal de-
fendants, rather than on the rights of the defendants, is misplaced.
One commentator has claimed that the test "requires such a mini-
mal level of performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of
the sixth amendment. '65 Another remarked that it is a puzzle why
the legal profession requires so much from other professions but
so little of itself: "[d] octors after all owe their patients much more
than a mockery of medicine. '66 Critics also have argued that the
needs to thwart feigned cases and to prevent putting defense coun-
sel on trial are insufficient to justify the imposition of the strict
standard in all situations.67 As noted by one commentator,
"[e]mbarrassment caused counsel by an unjust charge of ineffec-
tive assistance is a price that unfortunately must be paid at times
for careful judicial administration. And where the charge is the
remedy, it is not to save counsel from embarrassment but to save
his client from unjust conviction or sentence. '68
Still other criticism addresses the difficulty of administering the
test. The central complaint is that the "farce and mockery" stan-
dard is but a "descriptive metaphor," and thus provides no guide-
lines for courts' or counsels' decision making.69 What constitutes
effective representation under this standard is left to the subjec-
tive determinations of judges. Uniformity and predictability under
the test are noticeably lacking. In addition, the test encourages the
court to "define the affirmative duty of effective assistance by nega-
tive explanations. ' 70 By allowing the courts to uphold the results
of any trial in which counsel's performance falls short of gross mis-
63. Comment, supra note 19, at 31.
64. Id.
65. Bazelon, supra note 12, at 28.
66. Bines, supra note 16, at 928. The author also notes that unlike lawyers, doc-
tors are not presumed to be competent; moreover, doctors unlike lawyers,
"cannot offer evidence of good reputation or specific instances of skill to rebut
evidence of malpractice." Id. at 928 n.9.
67. Comment, supra note 19, at 31.
68. Bazelon, supra note 12, at 25 (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787,
796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958)).
69. Comment, supra note 61, at 194.
70. Id. at 195.
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representation, the courts "clarif[y] the misconduct to be avoided
rather than the positive steps which the attorney should take to
protect the accused's right to effective assistance."'
Another problem with administering the test is that the test as-
sumes that the errors will be recorded in the trial transcript. Thus,
the test is limited to judging the effectiveness of counsel at trial.
The importance of pretrial investigation, motions and advice is
given little credence. Furthermore, judgment of counsel's per-
formance at trial, if limited to review of the record, may be incom-
plete since "many errors will not be evident to an appellate court
precisely because defense counsel's performance was ineffec-
tive. 7 2
One last major criticism of the standard is that it is outdated
and can no longer stand up to analysis in light of the Supreme
Court's Gideon and McMann decisions. The argument is that the
"farce and mockery" test gained prominence before the sixth
amendment right to counsel was fully entrenched, and that, in fact,
Diggs is a fourteenth amendment case rather than a sixth amend-
ment decision. The fourteenth amendment imposes a higher stan-
dard for claims than does the sixth amendment. Thus, those
courts still using the case as authority, it is argued, are mis-
guided.73
As a result of these criticisms, only two circuit courts, the Tenth
and Second, have continued to apply the "farce and mockery"
standard. These courts have not offered any justification for re-
taining the test, other than the fact that the test has been applied
for a long time in their respective circuits.7 4 However, the Second
Circuit in two recent cases has suggested that, given the proper
opportunity, it will reassess its use of the standard, in light of the
other circuits' abandonment of it.75
B. Reasonableness Standard
Eight of the federal circuit courts and the Nebraska Supreme
Court have adopted a standard of reasonableness for use in deter-
mining whether counsel's performance was effective. There are
four major categories of expressions of the reasonableness stan-
71. Id.
72. Comment, supra note 19, at 32.
73. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1320 (9th Cir. 1978); Marzullo v.
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
74. United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 860
(1977).
75. See United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309, 318 n.15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 986 (1977); Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977).
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dard: (1) The quality of a defense counsel's representation should
be within the range of competence expected of attorneys in crimi-
nal cases (First and Fourth Circuits).76 (2) The quality of defense
counsel's representation should be within the range of customary
skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place
(Eighth, Third, Ninth, and the District of Columbia Circuits; the
state of Nebraska uses a combination of this and the first stan-
dard).77 (3) The quality of counsel's representation needs to meet
a minimum standard of professional responsibility (Seventh Cir-
cuit).78 (4) Assistance of counsel required by the sixth amend-
ment is counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering effective
assistance (Fifth Circuit;7 9 the Sixth Circuit uses a combination of
this and the first standard). 80
Despite these variations in the wording of the reasonableness
standards, in application they appear to be practically the same in
each circuit, with the exceptions of the Fourth Circuit and the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, which have delineated specific guidelines
for defense counsel to follow. In applying the standards, all the
courts have tended to utilize the same three sources as guide-
lines.81 The previously mentioned general rules 82 which have been
76. See, e.g., United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978); Marzullo v.
Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
77. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d
1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir.
1970). The standard in Nebraska as stated by the Nebraska Supreme Court is
whether counsel's performance measured up to that of a lawyer with ordi-
nary training and skill in the criminal law in his or her area as well as a show-
ing of conscientious protection of the interest of the client. State v. Bartlett,
199 Neb. 471, 472, 259 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1977).
78. United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377, 379 (7th Cir. 1976). What
this test purports to do is to give the indigent defendant assistance in all ar-
eas of representation (pretrial, investigatory, trial or otherwise) at a level
closely resembling that of the prosecution's representation. The court has
also stated:
The Constitution, unlike the judicial oath, does not go so far as to
promise equal justice to the poor and the rich .... While a criminal
trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the
ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed
prisoners to gladiators. The criminal defendant, whether repre-
sented by his chosen counsel, or a public agency, or a court-ap-
pointed lawyer, has the constitutional right to an advocate whose
performance meets a minimum professional standard.
United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1975).
79. Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
81. Those three sources are the: ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLIY
(1978) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE]; ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA
STANDARDS]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
82. See notes 45-46 & accompanying text supra.
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adopted by all the circuits are the basic reason for this similarity.
Most important of these is the presumption that lawyers are effec-
tive, and that inexperience in a given area of the law does not in
itself overcome that presumption. Also significant is the great def-
erence given to an attorney in the area of trial strategy and tactics.
One should, however, be aware of the difference in the wording of
the reasonableness standards, for it does indicate a potential for a
variation of the level of competence demanded by the various cir-
cuits. As criminal law becomes more specialized, the disparity be-
tween the first standard, which is tied to the trend in criminal
cases, and the others which are more general, will greatly increase.
The Eighth Circuit's reasonableness standard evolved from a
long line of cases that modified the "farce and mockery" standard.
Those cases attempted to lessen the strictness of the mockery
standard in several different manners so that the test would no
longer prevent courts from making a meaningful evaluation of a
sixth amendment violation claim. For example, in 1967 the court
held, in Cardarella v. United States,83 that the standard for the cir-
cuit was the "farce and mockery" standard. The court stated that
for a claim of ineffectiveness to be reviewable, the claim needed to
show error vital to the defendant's right to a fair trial, for otherwise
"there is no possible basis for a contention that counsel was
grossly negligent."84 The court quoted the following from a Tenth
Circuit case as stating the "farce and mockery" standard:
But the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel does
not vest in the accused the right to the services of an attorney who meets
any specified aptitude test in point of professional skill.... It is in-
stances in which resulting from the substandard level of the services of
the attorney the trial becomes a mockery and farcical that the judgment is
open to collateral attack on the ground that the accused was deprived of
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
8 5
The court, however, went on to hold that the petitioner's claim for
ineffectiveness was not valid, for reasons that required more from
the attorney than the "farce and mockery" standard. The court
stated that the petitioner's motion failed because:
Petitioner makes no claim that counsel did not try the case compe-
tently and in good faith insofar as concerns the trial strategy and tactics,
including the production of defense evidence and the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses, as well as making a skillful and cogent
argument to the jury and adequately objecting to the charge. Nor does he
contend that counsel had any physical or mental disability or had inade-
83. 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967).
84. Id. at 230.
85. Id. (quoting Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102, 103 (10th Cir. 1965)).
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quate time to prepare for trial.8 6
In 1971, in Robinson v. United States,8 7 the Eighth Circuit inter-
preted the "farce and mockery" standard to mean the deliberate
abandonment of one's ethical duty to one's client. The deliberate-
ness had to be such "as to render pretextual an attorney's legal
obligation to fairly represent the defendant." 88 In early 1974 the
court held in McQueen v. Swenson89 that the "farce and mockery"
standard was not to be taken literally; instead, the standard merely
placed a heavy burden on the defendant to show ineffectiveness of
counsel.90
Later in 1974, the court held, in Johnson v. United States,91 that
a more appropriate standard "would refer more precisely to the
professional competence of one who has completed a long and ar-
duous course of study for professional license, and who has ac-
quired some experience in applying legal principles and
conducting court trials. '92 Finally, in a 1976 case, United States v.
Easter,93 the court, citing the Johnson and Robinson cases, held
that the standard "established in our prior decisions" was that an
attorney fails to act effectively when the attorney "does not exer-
cise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent
attorney would perform under like circumstances."94 The court
noted that when an attorney fails to meet this standard, "the pro-
ceedings may be said to have been reduced to a 'farce' and 'mock-
ery' of justice. 9 5 The most recent Eighth Circuit cases on this
point have recited the customary skill test established in Easter,
with no mention of "farce and mockery. '96
The Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the "reasonableness
standard" in 1974 in State v. Leadinghorse.97 That opinion and
those following it give no indication why the test was established
and why the mockery test was abandoned. One possible reason is
that the court was merely following the lead of the Eighth Circuit.
The Easter decision has been cited by the court on occasion as au-
thority for the standard.98
86. 375 F.2d at 230.
87. 448 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1971).
88. Id. at 1256.
89. 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
90. Id. at 214.
91. 506 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975).
92. Id. at 646.
93. 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977).
94. Id. at 666.
95. Id.
96. See DuPree v. United States, 606 F.2d 829, 830 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Brown, 605 F.2d 389, 397 (8th Cir. 1979).
97. 192 Neb. 485, 222 N.W.2d 573 (1974).
98. See State v. Bartlett, 199 Neb. 471, 472, 259 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1977).
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To give substance to the competence standard, the State of Ne-
braska and the Eighth Circuit, as well as the other circuits employ-
ing the reasonableness standard, have utilized the American Bar
Association's Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and
the Defense Function.9 9 The ABA Standards, which set forth
guidelines for lawyers to follow generally and in specific situations,
were formulated by a committee of trial judges and lawyers and
reflect in large part their "long and varied experience.' 00 The
ABA House of Delegates formally adopted the Standards in 1971.
The District of Columbia Circuit and the State of Wisconsin have
judicially adopted them as their official criteria for determining
competency. 101 Nebraska and the remaining circuits have utilized
them only as advisory guidelines. 102 These courts have tended to
cite to specific provisions of the Standards rather than to the Stan-
dards as a whole. Furthermore, these courts apparently have
applied the Standards on a haphazard basis rather than automati-
cally applying them to every claim.
In applying the ABA Standards, both the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court of Nebraska have held
that defense counsel has a duty to consult with his or her client, to
advise that client, to assert at trial what may be that client's only
defense, and to make such preparations for arraignment and trial
as the facts of the case fairly demand. 0 3 The details of this last
duty, the duty to investigate, are set forth in Defense Function 4.1:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the cir-
cumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to
guilt and degree of guilt or penalty. The investigation should always in-
clude efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution
and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regard-
less of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyers of facts con-
stituting guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty. 10 4
In addition, the Nebraska Supreme Court, relying on Defense
Function 3.6, has held that an attorney must take prompt action to
preserve the defendant's legal rights, and that the attorney
"should consider all procedural steps which in good faith may be
taken, including, for example, .. moving to suppress illegally ob-
99. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81.
100. Id. at 7.
101. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v.
Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
102. See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 545 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976); State v.
Lang, 202 Neb. 9, 272 N.W.2d 775 (1978); State v. Bartlett, 197 Neb. 471, 474, 259
N.W.2d 917, 920 (1977).
104. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 81, at 225-26 (emphasis supplied).
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tained evidence."' 0 5 This emphasis on pretrial motions and pre-
trial investigation indicates that under the reasonableness
standard, an inquiry concerning whether a given attorney's per-
formance was competent will not be limited to his or her conduct
during the trial, as it was under the "farce and mockery" standard.
Reasoning along lines similar to the rationale underlying the
ABA Standards, some appellate courts (not including Nebraska
and the Eighth Circuit) have urged trial courts to apply a set of
specific things counsel should or should not do, in order to ascer-
tain the "range of competence demanded." The Fourth, Sixth and
District of Columbia Circuits have prescribed their own sets of cri-
teria.'0 6 These judicial criteria are to complement the ABA Stan-
dards and, in some instances, state bar canons.107 For example,
the Fourth Circuit has developed a list of six specific requirements
for effective sixth amendment representation: (1) counsel should
be appointed promptly; (2) the attorney should be given an oppor-
tunity to prepare a defense; (3) the attorney should confer
promptly and often with his or her client; (4) the attorney should
advise the client of his or her rights; (5) the attorney should elicit
from the client information necessary to ascertain the availability
of certain defenses; and (6) the attorney must make a thorough
factual and legal investigation of the case and must provide him-
self or herself with sufficient time to contemplate and prepare for
trial.'0 8 In addition, the District of Columbia Circuit, also has re-
quired that counsel take all necessary steps to preserve the rights
of his or her client, and that the attorney should discuss with the
client all potential strategies and tactical choices. 0 9
Unlike the others, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ex-
pressly avoided providing specific guidelines. The court recog-
nized that "[s]uch a checklist would serve to enhance the
objectivity of the general standard," but felt that it would be inap-
propriate because "it would be unwise to restrict the constitutional
requirement to a list of essential elements applicable to all of the
infinite variety of factual situations that arise.""10 The court cited
105. State v. Bartlett, 197 Neb. 471, 474, 259 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1977).
106. See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224,
226 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
107. See, e.g., United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1203 n.23. The court noted that
these enumerated duties were meant to be only starting points for the court
to use in developing "clearer guidelines for courts and for lawyers as to the
meaning of effective assistance." Id.
108. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1011 (1978) (quoting from Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968)).
109. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1204.
110. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978). The court stated that
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MeMann as authority for the proposition that guidelines are inad-
visable, and that the determination of the effectiveness of counsel
is best left to the discretion of the trial courts."'
Another weapon in the judicial arsenal for deciding ineffective
representation claims is the American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility." 2 One court said that the "reason-
ably competent" standard is no more than shorthand for the stan-
dard imposed by Canons 6 and 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Disciplinary Rules thereunder." 3 In addi-
tion, the ABA Standards impose a duty on every lawyer to know
the standards of professional conduct, as defined in codes and ca-
nons of the legal profession "to the end that his performance will
at all times be guided by appropriate standards."" 4 Comments to
the ABA Standards urge law schools and bar associations to make
efforts to ensure that all attorneys are fully cognizant of their ethi-
cal responsibilities." 5 Additionally, one commentator has even
urged the use of disciplinary procedures to help remedy ineffective
representation. 1 6 Yet the majority of the circuits have failed to
utilize the ABA Code, even as an advisory guideline. Although the
Nebraska Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court have
drawn authority from the Code," 7 their use of it has been sparse.
Applying the Code in Thomas v. Wyrick," 8 the Eighth Circuit
held that an attorney, to be effective, must at all times exercise his
or her professional responsibility on behalf of his or her client." 9
Furthermore, he or she should not habitually disregard available
information. 20 The parts of the Code used to support these two
principles were Canon 5 (A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent
one of the reasons the circuit abandoned the "farce and mockery" test was
that it was too subjective. While also recognizing that the reasonableness
standard "involves a measure of personal judgment," the court justified its
use because the judgment can be made by "reference to a fact the court
knows or can determine by inquiry." Id. at 1329-30.
111. Id. at 1330. The Supreme Court in McMann held that, for the most part, what
constitutes the right to effective counsel is up to the discretion of the trial
courts. The Court, however, urged the lower courts to maintain a standard of
performance for attorneys, noting that the right to counsel would be mean-
ingless if counsel is ineffective. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
(1970).
112. ABA CODE, supra note 81.
113. Schoonover v. State, 582 P.2d 292, 299 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).
114. ABA STANDARDs, supra note 81, at 171.
115. Id. at 175-76.
116. Bines, supra note 16, at 972-74.
117. See Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F-2d 407, 418 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868
(1976); State v. Lang, 202 Neb. 9, 272 N.W.2d 775 (1978).
118. 535 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
119. Id. at 413.
120. Id.
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Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client) and Canon 6 (A Law-
yer Should Represent a Client Competently) and Disciplinary
Rule 6-101(A).121 This Disciplinary Rule states that: "A lawyer
shall not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should
know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with
a lawyer who is competent to handle it. (2) Handle a legal matter
without preparation adequate in the circumstances. (3) Neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him."'122
The court in Wyrick found that the attorney was incompetent
because he failed to interview the government's witnesses. An im-
portant aspect of this decision is that the holding was made de-
spite the fact that, in the community at the time, there existed a
general policy of not interviewing such witnesses. 123 This might
indicate that the Eighth Circuit would consider a standard of rea-
sonableness that is not community-oriented; however, this has not
been the trend. The circuit's two most recent cases dealing with
incompetence have employed the community standard test an-
nounced in the Easter decision. 124
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in State v. Ondrak,125 used Ca-
non 7 to hold that an attorney had acted competently. The defend-
ant in Ondrak claimed that he had been denied effective
assistance when at sentencing, his attorney, instead of urging the
judge to place the defendant on probation, merely made comments
about the defendants past behavior.126 The court said:
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, states that one of
the primary duties of an attorney is to represent a client 'zealously within
the bounds of the law.' The record in this case demonstrates that the law-
yer involved did just that. We can only characterize the publication in the
briefs and the allegations of the petition herein [sic] being an irresponsi-
ble attack on a lawyer who did the best he could for a defendant in an
almost impossible situation and accomplishing a result which is perhaps
better than he could hope for. The defendant's best interests were served
by not pursuing an impossible approach; rather his best interests were
served by pursuing the few elements in the defendant's past record that
seemed to have a chance of success in influencing the sentencing
judge.1 2 7
Some courts utilized the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
on the Undertaking a Profession or Trade as a third source to give
substance to the competence standard.128 A cite to the Restate-
121. Id. at 413 n.6.
122. ABA CODE, supra note 81, Canon 6, DR 6-101(A).
123. 535 F.2d at 413.
124. See DuPree v. United States, 606 F.2d 829, 830 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Brown, 605 F.2d 389, 397 (8th Cir. 1979).
125. 186 Neb. 838, 186 N.W.2d 727 (1971).
126. Id. at 841, 186 N.W.2d at 729.
127. Id.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). See, e.g., Marzullo v. Mary-
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ment is usually accompanied by cites to annotations that discuss
the standard of care required of doctors and surgeons.129 Section
299A states that "unless he represents that he has greater or less
skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the
practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill
and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession
or trade in good standing in similar communities."' 3 0
Nebraska's competence standard adopts a similar community
comparison approach: "[C]ounsel's performance is measured
against that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the crim-
inal law in his area as well as a showing of conscientious protec-
tion of the interest of the client."' 31 In light of this community
orientation, and because Nebraska attorneys are engaged in prac-
tice in communities that vary greatly in size, it would seem appro-
priate, in determining the effectiveness standard in the state, to
note the following comment to section 299A:
Allowance must be made also for the type of community in which the ac-
tor comes on his practice. A country doctor cannot be expected to have
the equipment, facilities, experience, knowledge and the opportunity to
obtain it, afforded him by a large city. The standard is not, however, that
of the particular locality. If there are only three physicians in a small
town, and all three are highly incompetent, they cannot be permitted to
set a standard of utter inferiority for a fourth who comes into town. The
standard is rather that of persons engaged in similar practices in similar
localities, considering geographical location, size and the character of the
community in genera.
1 3 2
The comment also notes that the allowance is for those professions
where the degree of variation in the skill and knowledge among
members is high, for example, surgeons and physicians. Attor-
neys, it avers, do not fit into this category and thus, "allowance for
land, 561 F.2d 540, 544 n.9 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. lOll (1978);
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 n.24 (3d Cir. 1970).
129. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 n.27 (3d Cir. 1970). The
standard of care required of a doctor is dependent upon the locality of his
practice. Generally the rule is that
a physician must possess that reasonable degree of learning, skill,
and experience which ordinarily is possessed by others of his profes-
sion, and that he must exercise reasonable and ordinary care and dil-
igence in the exertion of his skill and the application of his
knowledge, and exert his best judgment as to the treatment of the
case entrusted to him-in short, a physician is bound to bestow such
reasonable and ordinary care, skill, and diligence as physicians and
surgeons in good standing in the neighborhood, in the same general
line of practice, ordinarily have and exercise in like cases.
61 AM. JuR. Phys. & S. § 110 (1972) (footnote omitted).
130. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
131. State v. Bartlett, 199 Neb. 471, 472, 259 N.W.2d 917, 919 (1977) (emphasis
added).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, Comment g (1965).
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them has seldom been made."' 33 Arguably, however, such an al-
lowance should be extended to lawyers because the resources
available to small town and small firm attorneys simply do not
equal those available to the larger community and larger firm at-
torneys. This is particularly true in an age that puts emphasis on
pretrial investigation and on specialization. Can a small town gen-
eral practitioner be compared with a criminal law specialist?
Beyond reference to these three sources of guidance, i.e., the
ABA Standards, the ABA Code, and the Restatement of Torts, the
best way to grasp an understanding of what would be deemed rea-
sonable representation is to review some of the courts' most recent
opinions. This is necessary because the reasonable representation
issue is largely left to the discretion of the courts. Reviewing Ne-
braska case law, the emphasis apparently has been on whether
counselffully asserted defendant's innocence and defenses at trial,
and on whether counsel vigorously represented his or her cli-
ent.134 It also is apparent that the Nebraska courts have analyzed
the defense attorney's performance in light of the strength of the
prosecution's case. 135 A quirk also has appeared: Nebraska courts,
unlike many of the federal circuit courts, have taken notice of the
experience of the attorney, as well as the attorney's recognized le-
gal accomplishments. 13 6
C. Criticisms Of The Reasonableness Standards
Some of the same criticisms directed at the "farce and mock-
ery" standard have also been directed at the reasonableness stan-
dards. The major criticism has been that the standards are too
vague and lack any clear criteria which courts can use in applying
them.137 Thus, some critics have argued that in application, the
reasonableness standards are just as subjective as the "mockery"
standard. 13 8 The exceptions to this line of attack, of course, are
those reasonable standards which incorporate a set of specific cri-
teria. One commentator expressed the view that:
[U] tilization of lists of defense counsel's duties offers great potential for
improving the handling of ineffective cases. Such lists will not eliminate
ineffectiveness claims, nor make them capable of instant disposition. But
in providing a statement of what effective representation is and not
merely a negative shibboleth about what it is not, the lists offer an objec-
133. Id.
134. State v. Mays, 203 Neb. 487, 492, 279 N.W.2d 146, 150 (1979).
135. See State v. Nokes, 192 Neb. 884, 889, 224 N.W.2d 776, 779-80 (1975).
136. See State v. Robinson, 194 Neb. 111, 112, 230 N.W.2d 222, 224 (1975); State v.
Oziah, 186 Neb. 541, 547, 184 N.W.2d 725, 728 (1971) (used while applying the
"farce and mockery" standard).
137. Comment, supra note 19, at 41; Comment, supra note 61, at 194.
138. Comment, supra note 19, at 41.
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tive and uniform starting point from which all courts can determine what
defense counsel should have done .... [T]he guidelines will aid appel-
late judges in the dispatch of their duties, providing a common ground
from which they ma
fact ineac cae~y develop a rational analysis and evaluation of thefacts in each case.
1 3 g
A related criticism of the reasonableness standards has been
that some of the standards beg the question by incorporating the
very terms that they attempt to define.14° For example, the Fifth
Circuit's standard refers to "counsel reasonably likely to render
and rendering reasonably effective assistance of counsel." 141
There are advantages to the reasonableness standards. First,
the standards, at least on their face, are more generous to the de-
fendant bringing a claim of ineffectiveness than the mockery of
justice standard. 42 Second, they allow courts to make more seri-
ous evaluations of the claims than does the mockery test. As one
commentator pointed out, " [t] he more a particular standard is ori-
ented toward the mockery-type test-the easier it will be for a
court to find that the pleading requires no evidentiary hearing
since the allegations of ineffectiveness will have to be proportion-
ately more extensive and persuasive."'143 Third, the reasonable-
ness standards allow a court to overturn a conviction for
something less than two attorneys' serious breach of duty which
deprived the defendant of a fair trial. In other words, the reasona-
bleness standards move away from the policy, reflected in the
"farce and mockery" standard, that finality in criminal cases out-
weighs the consequences of inferior representation except under
the most unusual of circumstances. The emphasis under the rea-
sonableness standards is on the defendant's right to effective rep-
resentation. Fourth, the reasonableness standards, unlike the
"mockery" standard, take the emphasis off the trial proceedings,
and allow ineffective assistance claims to be brought concerning
all areas of the law.144 Finally, some commentators have argued
that the flexibility in the reasonableness standards is an advantage
rather than a disadvantage. The argument is that "by specifying
the level of practice prevailing in the community as a concrete
standard... some of the subjectivity inherent in the [mockery]
test can be avoided."'145 And by being flexible, the reasonableness
standards prevent the test from being applied mechanically in a
139. Id. at 53.
140. Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L REV. 1077, 1078 (1973);
Comment, supra note 61, at 194.
141. Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974).
142. Comment, supra note 19, at 40.
143. Strazzella, supra note 15, at 454-55.
144. Comment, supra note 19, at 41.
145. Id. at 41-42.
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very volatile area. This viewpoint is reflected by the Supreme
Court opinion in McMann and by the Ninth Circuit, which refused
to adopt a specific checklist for attorneys and the courts, opting
instead to leave it to the discretion of the district judges.146 As one
commentator has noted:
[the standards] call for case-by-case determinations since precedents of
broad general value are scarce in this area .... [T]here is no formula
that will or should work mechanically in the ineffectiveness area. The
best that can be done is to isolate relevant factors and apply them with an
eye on the realities of defense work and on the vital constitutional right
involved. 14 7
V. RETAINED v. APPOINTED COUNSEL
The trend today in the disposition of ineffectiveness claims is
not to make a distinction between retained and appointed attor-
neys. However, at least two federal circuit courts, the Fifth and the
Tenth, have retained the distinction. 48 Two theories have been
advanced to support the holding that an allegation of ineffective
assistance of retained counsel is not actionable: (1) The errors of
the attorney are, under an agency theory, imputed to the defend-
ant who hired the attorney as a representative; and (2) the four-
teenth amendment's state action requirement is not satisfied when
counsel is retained rather than appointed.
An example of the application of the agency theory can be seen
in United States v. Riebold,149 in which the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated:
[W] e observe that even had Morgan's then retained counsel undertaken
'little or no action' between December, 1974 and August, 1975, thereby
rendering his representation a sham, farce or mockery as now contended,
(a) it did not extend to or affect the representation at trial, and (b) Mor-
gan must assume the fault for any failure of his trial counsel to exercise
greater diligence inasmuch as counsel was retained in each instance.
150
An older case which illustrates the extreme to which this theory
was applied is Hudspeth v. McDonald,'5 ' a 1941 Tenth Circuit case.
The Hudspeth court held the following:
The most that can be said for this testimony is that it establishes that
appellee's counsel drank throughout the trial and that he was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor to a greater or less degree during the whole
trial. But what of it? Appellee employed him; he paid him a substantial
fee, and had a right to his services if he desired them, even though he
146. See notes 110-111 & accompanying text supra.
147. Strazzella, supra note 15, at 455.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Childs, 571 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1978); Fitzgerald v.
Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975).
149. 557 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977).
150. Id. at 703.
151. 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941).
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might have been under the influence of intoxicants. 1 5 2
The agency theory has been sharply criticized, and its total
abandonment has been urged. The critics' main argument has
been that the commercial law doctrine of agency is inappropriate
in the criminal law area. It is inappropriate because the criminal
principal (the client), unlike the commercial principal, is unlikely
to be the knowledgeable director of the relationship.153 Similarly,
it has been argued that it is simply "unfair to impute the ineffec-
tiveness of an attorney to a defendant who does not possess the
knowledge necessary to understand or detect his attorney's dere-
lictions.' u5 4 Along these same lines, it is also arguable that the er-
rors should not be imputed, for many individuals are not
knowledgeable about the attorneys that they hired. Their unfamil-
iarity with the legal process also makes them unfamiliar with what
constitutes a good criminal attorney, and therefore who is a good
criminal attorney. The ABA restrictions on advertisement is one
reason this unfamiliarity exists. 5 5
An example of the lack of state action theory is presented in the
Fifth Circuit's Fitzgerald v. Estellel5 6 decision. The court held that
in order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a
case involving retained counsel, the defendant must establish ei-
ther that retained counsel performed so poorly as to render the
proceedings fundamentally unfair, or that retained counsel's con-
duct fell short of reasonably effective assistance and some respon-
sible government official connected with the criminal proceeding
who could have remedied the conduct failed in this duty to accord
justice to the accused.1,5 7 The court held that state action could be
found by either method since the right to counsel is guaranteed by
the fourteenth as well as the sixth amendment.158 The first test is
directed toward the fourteenth amendment. The court has stated
that "where a lawyer's ineffectiveness renders the trial fundamen-
tally unfair, state action is present because the state's criminal jus-
tice system has failed and enforcement of the resultant judgment
would violate due process regardless of whether counsel is re-
tained or appointed."' 5 9 The second test is directed at a sixth
amendment claim. Because the court found that the sixth amend-
ment covered a greater range of counsel errors than the four-
152. Id. at 967 (emphasis supplied).
153. Annot., 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 236 n.39 (1976).
154. 5 Am. Jun. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Ineffective Assistance of Counsel § 3 (1975).
155. See generally ABA CODE, supra note 81, Canon 2, DR 2-101.
156. 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975).
157. Id. at 1337.
158. Id. at 1336-37.
159. United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing the
holding of Estelle).
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teenth, it ruled that the stricter test was needed.160 The stricter
standard was justified by noting that a lower burden would require
the trial judge to question the tactics and strategy of retained
counsel throughout the trial. This, the court reasoned, would place
an intolerable burden on the court, and would often be counter-
productive for the defendant. 16 1 Additionally, the court stated that
it was fundamentally unfair to charge the state with responsibility
for something which it had little chance to correct. 162
A major criticism of the type of state action test announced in
Estelle has been that it ignores the fact that the whole criminal
trial and procedure is state action. 163 The dissent in Estelle noted
that, "[w] here counsel is retained, the necessity of state action is
satisfied because the state adjudicatory machinery is inextricably
intertwined with the conduct of an accused person's retained attor-
ney."' 64 The dissenting opinion set forth the following examples:
(1) the state provides for judges (pays them and sets their qualifi-
cations); (2) the state furnishes the physical facilities; (3) the state
provides for the selection, summoning and paying of jurors; (4) the
state retains controls over the accused from arrest to ultimate re-
lease; (5) the state selects the class of people from which the ac-
cused can retain an attorney; (6) the state has the power to bar and
to disbar attorneys; (7) the form of an attorney's pleadings and or-
ders are prescribed by the state; (8) the state court, within certain
limits, may command the attorney's presence and may even direct
his or her timetable by postponing or advancing a given trial date;
and (9) most importantly, attorneys are essential to the judicial
machinery, for unless an accused knowingly waives his right to
counsel no critical stage of the criminal process can proceed until
the accused retains counsel or counsel is appointed for him.165
The theory has also been criticized as constitutionally unsound.
It has been argued that there should not be the distinction be-
tween the fourteenth and sixth amendments; since the sixth
amendment is totally incorporated in the fourteenth amendment,
the due process clause offers the same protection that the sixth
amendment offers.166 The issue is not whether the state deprived
the defendant of the constitutional right to effective counsel, but.
whether the defendant was denied a fair trial because he or she
160. Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d at 1336-37.
161. Id. at 1337.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1344-45 (Godbold, J., dissenting); Comment, Incompetency of Counsel,
25 BAYLOR L. REV. 299, 311 (1973).
164. 505 F.2d at 1345 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
165. Id.
166. 89 HARv. L REV. 593, 596-97 (1976).
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did not have effective counsel. 167
Other critics have argued that there is not sufficient distinction
between retained and appointed counsel to justify the result that
the same error for which relief would not be granted if committed
by a retained counsel would be the basis for relief simply because
the attorney was appointed.16 8 The recent Supreme Court deci-
sion of Ferri v. Adcerman169 underscores this criticism, at least
where federal courts are involved. Although the decision deals
with malpractice, much of the reasoning of the Court can easily be
adopted to ineffectiveness claims.
In Ferri, a criminal defendant convicted in federal court
brought a malpractice suit against his appointed attorney. The
suit was brought in state court, where it was dismissed, originally
and on appeal, because the attorney appointed was held to be im-
mune from liability. 7 0 Since the first proceeding was in a federal
court, the United States Supreme Court, reviewed federal statu-
tory and common law and held that the attorney was not immune
from liability.17 ' The Court found that the legislative history of the
federal criminal justice act, under which the attorney was ap-
pointed, revealed an attempt on the part of Congress to minimize
the difference between retained and appointed counsel. It found
that "Congress clearly wanted appointed counsel to share as much
of retained counsel's characteristic independence from the govern-
ment as was possible notwithstanding the government subsidy."'7 2
The Court also noted that many private citizens and organizations
receive government monies, and that it was never the govern-
ment's intention that these recipients be immune on the basis of
actions taken in the course of expending those funds. 7 3
With regard to federal common law on the issue of immunity,
the Cout held that the immunity which extended to various fed-
eral officiers for claims arising out of the performance of their du-
ties did not extend to lawyers appointed to represent indigent
defendants. 174 The Court's rationale was that the appointed attor-
167. Id.
168. Comment, supra note 163, at 311.
169. 100 S. Ct. 402 (1979).
170. Id. at 405.
171. Id. at 410.
172. Id. at 407 n.16. The Court held that it was Congress' intent that all defense
counsel would satisfy the same standards and be subject to the same controls.
Id.
173. Id. at 408. The Court found that the government compensation was only to
serve as an incentive for appointed counsel to be as diligent and as thorough
as retained counsel. Id. at 406-07.
174. Id. at 409. The Court stated that although lawyers are often referred to as
"officers of the court," they are not officers of the government, in the ordinary
sense, who would be entitled to immunity.
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ney's role more closely parallels the role of privately retained
counsel than that of a judge who is given immunity. The Court
indicated that the appointed attorney's duty, unlike that of a judge,
is not to serve the public at large but to serve the individual inter-
ests of his client. An indispensable element of an appointed attor-
ney's responsibility "is the ability to act independently of the
government and to oppose it in adversary litigation."'1 75 Further-
more, the Court noted that "[t]he fear that an unsuccessful de-
fense of a criminal charge will lead to a malpractice claim does not
conflict with performance of that function. If anything, it provides
the same incentive for appointed and retained counsel to perform
that function competently."'176 It is important to note for the pur-
poses of ineffectiveness claims that the Court found that Congress
intended that all defense counsel satisfy the same standards of
professional responsibility and be subject to the same controls. As
authority the Court cited to the ABA Standards.
177
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not specifically held that, for
sixth amendment purposes, there is no distinction between re-
tained and appointed counsel. However, none of the Nebraska
cases have made the distinction, and in State v. Moss,178 the court
held that there was no merit to the argument that a court ap-
pointed attorney has a duty greater than or different from that of
one who was retained.179
The Eighth Circuit has specifically held that the constitutional
standard for determining whether counsel is effective is the same
for both appointed and retained counsel' °8 0 However, the court in
Unlike these officials [marshaUs, bailiffs, court clerks or judges] a
lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important though it be to
our system of justice. In general, he makes his own decisions, fol-
lows his own best judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own
business. The word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers
conveys quite a different meaning from the word 'officer' as applied
to people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of that
term.
Id. at 408 n.19 (quoting from Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956)).
175. Id. at 409.
176. Id. at 409 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
177. Id. at 407 n.17. This decision might also have some impact on the use of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 by indigent criminal defendants to bring suits alleging ineffec-
tiveness. See generally, Annot., 36 A.LR. FED. 594 (1976). The trend in the
cases involving section 1983 had been to hold that the mere appointment of
counsel was not enough to establish the requisite state action needed to
bring suit under that section. The Court's Ferri opinion appears to be sup-
portive of this trend.
178. 185 Neb. 536, 177 N.W.2d 284 (1970).
179. Id. at 539, 177 N.W.2d at 286.
180. Crismon v. United States, 510 F.2d 356, 357 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975); Garton v. Swen-
son, 497 F.2d 1137, 1139 n.4 (8th Cir. 1974); Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360
(8th Cir. 1968).
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Garton v. Swenson,181 indicated that there were two practical fac-
tors which should be kept in mind:
While the constitutional standards for retained and appointed counsel
may well be the same, other practical factors need be considered. We are
not unmindful that the layman has little expertise in choosing a lawyer
and should not be held completely responsible for the professional compe-
tency of his retained attorney. On the other hand, the trial court prior to
or during trial is in a difficult position if it chooses to question the compe-
tency of a defendant's retained attorney. The defendant might well claim
that the court was prejudiced or unduly interfering with trial strategy.18 2
VI. AUTOMATIC REVERSAL v. HARMLESS ERROR
Another controversial topic in the area of ineffectiveness claims
is whether, once ineffectiveness has been established, the peti-
tioner is entitled to automatic reversal or whether the petitioner
must in addition show that he or she has been prejudiced by the
constitutional violation. The harmless error rule was first adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in 1967 in the decision of
Chapman v. California.183 Under the doctrine, unless the consti-
tutional violation is one which involves a substantial right of the
parties, the mere violation of a constitutional right does not guar-
antee reversal. 184 There will not be a reversal if the government
can demonstrate that the violation did not in any way contribute to
the conviction. 85 The rule was adopted because the Court felt that
it was unnecessary to set aside convictions for "small errors or de-
fects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result
of trial."'186
The controversy with regard to ineffectiveness of counsel
claims has arisen because there has been a disagreement in the
federal courts as to whether the right to effective counsel is a "sub-
stantial" right of the parties. The Third and Sixth Circuits have
held that it is,187 pointing to the Supreme Court decisions in Glas-
ser v. United States188 and Chapman v. California, which held that
the right to counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair
181. 497 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1974).
182. Id. at 1139 n.4. In that same decision the court suggested that claims raised
on collateral attack might require a different constitutional standard than
those raised on direct appeal, the rationale being that the nature of the past
conviction procedure requires a stricter standard.
183. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
184. Id. at 22.
185. Id. at 23.
186. Id. at 22.
187. See, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970); Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970).
188. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
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trial. 189 The remaining circuit courts have held that ineffective
counsel falls into the harmless error category, on the theory that
there is a distinction between the right to counsel and the right to
effective counsel.190 They have argued that because the advice of
counsel is essential to exercise the defendant's other rights, "a to-
tal absence of counsel cannot but be harmful."191 Yet when coun-
sel is present, the presumption is not justified, and, thus, the
seriousness of the violation must be examined in terms of the facts
of the case.192
The advocates of the automatic reversal rule have responded
that the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel is the
right to effective counsel. Further, they have emphasized that the
incompetent counsel may in a given situation be no better or worse
than no representation at all: "After all, the purpose of Gideon
was not merely to supply criminal defendants with warm bodies
but rather to guarantee reasonably competent representation."' 93
The proponents of the automatic reversal rule have also argued
that such a rule is more in line with the most recent Supreme
Court cases which dealt specifically with ineffectiveness'94 of coun-
sel: Herring v. New York 195 (ineffectiveness found when an attor-
ney was prevented from making a closing argument) and Holloway
v. Arkansas196 (ineffectiveness found in the appointment of one
attorney for two codefendants with conflicting interests). In both
cases the Court held that in instances of counsel's ineffectiveness
like those presented, no prejudice need be shown.197
VII. BURDEN OF PROOF
In those circuits which have followed the harmless error rule,
there is further controversy over which party should bear the bur-
den of establishing that the criminal defendant was prejudiced be-
189. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at
72.
190. The Fourth Circuit has not specifically adopted the automatic reversal rule,
but the circuit has reversed cases once ineffectiveness has been proved, with-
out going into whether or not the defendant was prejudiced. See, e.g., Tolliver
v. United States, 563 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1977); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d
540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
191. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir. 1974).
192. Id.
193. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1338 n.11 (9th Cir. 1978) (Huffstedler, J.,
dissenting); see also Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Harmless
Error Rule: The Eighth Circuit Abandons Chapman, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1384, 1398 (1975).
194. 586 F.2d at 1335 (Huffstedler, J., dissenting).
195. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
196. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
197. Id. at 489; 422 U.S. at 858.
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cause he or she was denied effective assistance of counsel. Some
of the circuits have held that the burden falls on the government,
while others have held that it falls on the defendant. Still others
have taken an intermediary position.
Those circuits which place the burden on the defendant 98 do so
for four reasons: First, many of the errors caused by counsel's in-
effectiveness do not appear in the trial record. Thus, it is difficult
for the government to determine which witness should or could
have been called, which defenses could or should have been
raised, and what investigations should or could have been per-
formed. Since it is the defendant who possesses the greatest ac-
cess to this kind of evidence the burden should fall to him or
her.19 9 Second, the defendant could purposefully frustrate or hin-
der the government's efforts in ascertaining the needed facts by
asserting his or her privilege against self-incrimination. 200 Third, if
the burden were placed on the government, it would, in effect, be
penalized for something over which it had no control.20 1 Finally, if
the government had the burden of proof, it would force it into a
"big brother" position. The government would be forced into mon-
itoring defense counsel's handling of the case from beginning to
end to ensure that he or she did not commit any prejudicial errors.
Additionally, both the defendant and the defense counsel would
have to be interviewed to determine why defense counsel chose to
act in a particular manner, which would wreak havoc on the adver-
sary system: "The attorney-client privilege would be breached; the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination would be
eliminated, and the sixth amendment right to counsel would be
rendered a nullity by virtue of the restrictions placed on the attor-
ney's freedom of action. '20 2
The circuit courts and critics that have advocated that the bur-
den should be on the government have made the following sup-
portive arguments: (1) It is the government which in the first
instance (the trial) has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty. Placing the burden to show
prejudice on the defendant unfairly shifts the initial burden, be-
cause the defendant, to show prejudice, must establish his or her
innocence. It is no answer to say that the appellant has already
198. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978); Loftis v. Estelle,
515 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ingram, 477 F.2d 236 (7th Cir.
1973).
199. Note, supra note 193, at 1404.
200. Id.
201. United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coles v. Peyton,
389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968).
202. Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Who Bears the Burden of Proof?
29 BAYLOR L. REV. 29, 53 (1977).
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had a trial in which the government was put to proof, because the
heart of the ineffective claim is that the effectiveness deprived him
or her of a full adversary hearing.20 3 (2) It is not always clear that
the defendant has the greatest access to the evidence. It is also
doubtful that the indigent criminal defendant will have the re-
sources available to him to establish prejudice, e.g., conduct the
necessary investigations. (3) Placing the burden on the defendant
will discourage the bringing of ineffectiveness claims, because the
benefit of the doubt is with the government.204 "This result is per-
haps salutary where the claim is frivolous or marginally debatable,
but it also may chill the invocation of one of the defendant's funda-
mental rights. ' '205
The Eighth Circuit has adopted an intermediary position which
has recently been followed in Nebraska.206 The circuit court has
required that the defendant bear the initial burden of proof by
showing the existence of admissible evidence which could have been un-
covered by reasonable investigation and which would have proved helpful
to the defendant either on cross-examination or in his case-in-chief at the
original trial. Once this showing is made, a new trial is warranted unless
the court is able to declare a belief that the omission of such evidence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 0 7
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held that if the defendant can
show that circumstances beyond his or her control have made it
impossible to produce any helpful evidence, the burden shifts to
the government.2 08 When it established this rule, the court indi-
cated that to do otherwise would be to penalize the government for
something which it could not control. In addition, it noted that the
defendants usually have greater access to the type of evidence
needed.
The critics of this standard are the proponents of the doctrine
that the government has the burden. They have argued that this
position, as well as the one that places the burden on the defend-
ant, completely ignores the Supreme Court mandate in Chapman
v. California:20 9
Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudi-
cial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person
prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is for this rea-
son that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on
the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to
203. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1334 (9th Cir. 1978) (Huffstedler, J., dis-
senting).
204. Comment, supra note 61, at 196.
205. Id.
206. See State v. Lang, 202 Neb. 12, 272 N.W.2d 775 (1978).
207. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 220 (8th Cir. 1974).
208. Id. at 220.
209. Id. at 218.
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suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment.2 10
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that there needs to be a major overhaul of the
present law on ineffective representation. Since 1932, the Supreme
Court has recognized that the sixth amendment guarantees the
right to effective counsel to a criminal defendant in those situa-
tions in which the defendant has the right to counsel. However,
the Court has given little substance to the right. It has opted to
leave the development of the amendment to the discretion of the
trial courts.
The trial courts have begun to establish criteria for the determi-
nation of whether representation was effective. However, courts
other than the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals and
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, have made the determination
on a haphazard, case-by-case basis. Authorities like the ABA De-
fense Function Standards and the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility have been sparingly used by the courts in establishing the
criteria. This is true despite the fact that all attorneys are, or
should be, aware of the duties and responsibilities enumerated in
them, and are expected to abide by them. The right to effective
counsel is also weakened by the fact that many courts have re-
fused to employ the automatic reversal rule once ineffective coun-
sel has been found. Some courts have gone even further by
requiring the defendant to show that he was prejudiced by the er-
ror. As a result, the right to effective counsel is a hollow right.
Because of the way the standards function, it is the defendant's
attorney who is protected, not the defendant. The attorney is pre-
sumed to have acted competently. The fact that the attorney may
have been ill, intoxicated or inexperienced generally or in the
crininal law is given little significance. The attorney does not have
210. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted). The Eighth Cir-
cuit has argued
that it is not the sort of error envisioned in Chapman which automat-
ically puts a burden on the 'beneficiary of the error either to prove
that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously ob-
tained judgment' .... Unlike a constitutional voliation actually
caused by the state, such as an illegal search and seizure or a coerced
confession, ineffective assistance of counsel is a result of the viola-
tional acts of one charged with representing the defendant. It is, in
this sense, not a product of an adversary, but a flaw in the adversary
process. To impose automatically the initial burden of proof on the
state as described in Chapman would penalize the prosecution for
acts over which it can have no control. In such circumstances, a
more equitable sharing of the burden of proof seems appropriate.
McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d at 218-19 (citations & footnote omitted). Once
again, it is back to the state action argument.
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to aim for perfection. Instead, he or she is given a broad leeway in
choosing trial strategy and is given the benefit of the doubt as-to
whether an intelligent and reasonable choice was made, even
when hindsight shows that the choice was catastrophic.
Greater emphasis needs to be placed on whether an attorney
has lived up to the expectations and duties enunciated in the ABA
Code and the ABA Standards. Moreover, greater recognition must
be given to the fact the right to counsel is meaningless without the
right to effective counsel. Thus, procedurally, the right to effective
counsel should be on the same level as the right to counsel.
The adversary system cannot operate without the services of highly
trained advocates for each side as well as a judge skilled in advocacy. Al-
though our law recognizes the right of a defendant to defend himself with-
out the assistance of counsel if he so chooses, judges, prosecutors and
defense counsel are unanimous in the opinion that justice is undeter-
mined when any party proceeds without a professional advocate. The ac-
cused lacks the knowledge which would permit him to take full advantage
of his legal rights and demonstrate his position if he elects a trial. It
seems amply clear today that a professional advocate for the accused is
indispensable to the system .... 2 11
Marianne Harvell '80
211. ABA STANmDADs, supra note 81, at 145.
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